Large-scale human cooperation among unrelated individuals requires the enforcement of social norms. However, such enforcement poses a problem because non-enforcers can free ride on others' costly and risky enforcement. One solution is that enforcers receive benefits relative to non-enforcers. Here we show that this solution becomes functional during the preschool years: 5-year-old (but not 4-year-old) children judged enforcers of norms more positively, preferred enforcers, and distributed more resources to enforcers than to non-enforcers. The ability to sustain not only first-order but also second-order cooperation thus emerges quite early in human ontogeny, providing a viable solution to the problem of higherorder cooperation.
Introduction
Humans regularly cooperate with others, often even with strangers and often even at a cost to themselves (Sober & Wilson, 1998) . Since such cooperation results in a greater loss for the cooperating individuals than for free riders (who benefit from the outcomes of the cooperation without investing any resources), it is a puzzle how such cooperation could evolve and be maintained. The classic theories of kin selection and reciprocity provide some answers, but they cannot explain cooperation in large groups of unrelated individuals (Sripada, 2005) . One effective solution to the puzzle of large-scale cooperation is that those who break the norms of cooperation are punished, which induces the norm-violators to cooperate more in future interactions and thus enforces the norms of cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Nowak, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) .
However, norm enforcement can be costly and risky to the enforcer. Despite these costs, people across numerous cultures are willing to pay costs to punish non-cooperators and thus enforce cooperative norms (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich, 2004) . Such norm enforcement can itself be considered a cooperative act because in addition to the enforcer, all other members of the group also benefit from the non-cooperator's increased future cooperation (Yamagishi, 1986) . A second-order problem of cooperation thus arises: If enforcers pay costs and take risks to enforce norms on non-cooperators, but the non-cooperator's increased future cooperation benefits not only the enforcer but also other group members, then enforcers are at a disadvantage relative to nonenforcers. How, then, can the costly and risky enforcement of cooperative norms evolve and be maintained?
One possibility is that enforcers receive benefits for their punitive behavior that non-enforcers do not receive (Barclay, 2006; Fessler & Haley, 2003; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001) . For instance, enforcers may be seen to be more committed to the group and its norms, less willing to tolerate norm violations, and more trustworthy than non-enforcers. Enforcers may thus be judged more positively, respected, preferred, and more likely to be selected as cooperative partners than non-enforcers (Fessler & Haley, 2003; Frank, 1988) . Moreover, as norm enforcement can be considered a cooperative act, and as cooperative people receive more material rewards from group members than less cooperative people (e.g., Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) , enforcers may also receive more material rewards than non-enforcers.
A few empirical studies have examined the question of how costly norm enforcement could be sustained (e.g., Barclay, 2006; Horita, 2010; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008; Nelissen, 2008) and have shown that enforcers do typically receive more reputational and material benefits than non-enforcers (though these effects are not unequivocal and adults may even disapprove of particularly severe or aggressive norm enforcement; Eriksson, Andersson, & Strimling, 2016) . However, these studies have all involved adults, leaving unclear when in ontogeny this solution to the problem of second-order cooperation becomes functional. In other words, we http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.011 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
